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1962/11/14

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PRIORITY

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CUBA

AT MTG WITH SYG THIS MORNING STEVENSON AND MCCLOY GAVE HIM
ACCOUNT OF PRESENT STATUS US-SOV NEGOTS.

SYG RESPONDED BY REPORTING ON HIS RECENT NEGOTS WITH CUBANS AND SOVS ON UN VERIFICATION. THANT SAID HE HAD SOUNDED OUT LECHUGA INFORMALLY NOV 8 ON ACCEPTABILITY FIVE LA AMBS IN CUBA FOR DUAL PURPOSE OF VERIFYING WITHDRAWAL OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AND OF SERVING AS LIAISON BETWEEN UN AND CUBAN GOVT IN REGARD TO SOLUTION CUBAN CRISIS. ON NOV 11 LECHUGA INFORMED SYG HIS GOVT'S RESPONSE TO FIRST FUNCTION PROPOSED FOR LA AMBS WAS NEGATIVE AND ITS REACTION TO SECOND PROPOSED FUNCTION WAS POSITIVE. WHEN SYG INQUIRED WHETHER CASTRO OBJECTS TO LATIN AMERICANS PERFORMING THESE FUNCTIONS, LECHUGA REPLIED IN THE NEGATIVE BUT ADDED THAT HIS GOVT IS UNHAPPY ABOUT ACTION LA COUNTRIES IN OAS ON OCT 23.

CONSEQUENTLY ON NOV 12 SYG MADE FORMAL PROPOSAL IN WRITING TO LECHUGA PROPOSING, IN PLACE LA AMBS, GROUP OF AMBS FROM "NON-ALIGNED" COUNTRIES IN ASIA, AFRICA, EUROPE AND LA TO PERFORM SAME TWO FUNCTIONS, I.E., VERIFICATION AND LIAISON BETWEEN CUBA AND UN. NO REPLY HAS YET BEEN RECEIVED TO THIS SECOND PROPOSAL AND LECHUGA APPEARED TO EXPECT HIS GOVT'S REPLY WOULD BE IDENTICAL WITH ITS REACTION TO FIRST INFORMAL PROPOSAL, THAT IS NEGATIVE ON VERIFICATION AND POSITIVE ON LIAISON.

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-2- 1781, November 14, 8 p.m. from New York

SYG CONTINUED THAT, WHILE HE, LIKE US AND USSR, FEELS SC
MIG IS UNDESIRABLE AT THIS STAGE, HE NEVERTHELESS FEELS OBLIGATION
TO REPORT TO SC IN NEAR FUTURE SINCE ALMOST THREE WEEKS
HAS ELAPSED SINCE HIS APPEAL TO INTERESTED PARTIES IN CUBAN
CRISIS. HE WAS THINKING IN TERMS OF WRITTEN REPORT TO SC NOV
16 FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF CASTRO'S REPLY TO HIS PROPOSAL. BOTH
US REPS AND HIS OWN COLLEAGUES (BUNCHE AND LOUFI) DISCOURAGED
IDEA OF WRITTEN REPORT TO SC AT THIS POINT WHILE NEGOTIATIONS
ARE STILL IN FLUID STATE AND SYG APPEARED WILLING TO DELAY.

IN RESPONSE TO QUERY HE EXPLAINED THAT WHAT HE HAD IN MIND IN
PROPOSING NON-ALIGNED AMBASSADORIAL GROUP IN HAVANA SERVE AS
LIAISON BETWEEN UN AND CASTRO WAS THAT, PARTLY THROUGH THEIR
GOOD OFFICES, CASTRO MIGHT BE GRADUALLY PULLED OUT OF ALL
BLOCKS AND INTO MILITARILY NON-ALIGNED POSITION WHICH HE HAD
APPARENTLY ASPIRED TO WHEN HE PARTICIPATED IN BELGRADE CONFERENCE
LAST YEAR.

THERE ENSURED CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION OF VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS
DURING WHICH STEVENSON AND MCCLOY ATTEMPTED TO DRAW
CLEAR LINE BETWEEN IMMEDIATE VERIFICATION WITHDRAWAL OFFENSIVE
WEAPONS AND LONGER TERM SAFEGUARDS AGAINST REINTRODUCTION
SUCH WEAPONS INTO CUBA. SYG EMPHASIZED THAT CASTRO INSISTED
ON RECIPROCITY IN REGARD TO ANY MEASURES OF VERIFICATION OR
INSPECTION AND THAT HE, THANT, DOUBTED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE
TO CARRY OUT EITHER SHORT OR LONG TERM MEASURES OF THIS KIND
WITHOUT RECIPROCAL FEATURES. THERE WAS MENTION OF POSSIBLE
INSPECTION SOLELY OF CUBAN EXILE CAMPS IN US AND ELSEWHERE
AS QUID PRO QUO FOR VERIFICATION WITHDRAWAL OFFENSIVE WEAPONS
FROM CUBA. US NEGOTIATORS EMPHASIZED IN LATTER CONNECTION
THAT MERE INSPECTION OF VACANT MISSILE SITES WOULD NOT BE
SUFFICIENT AND THAT INSPECTORS MUST HAVE FREEDOM TO INVESTIGATE
REPORTS OF CONCEALED WEAPONS IN CAVES OR ELSEWHERE. AS TO
LONG-TERM SAFEGUARDS NARASIMHAN SUGGESTED THAT UN COMMISSION,
CONSTITUTED FROM NON-ALIGNED AMBS OR OTHERWISE, MIGHT BE
CHARGED ON THE ONE HAND WITH ASSURING THAT THERE WAS NO
REINTRODUCTION OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AND ON OTHER HAND OF
POLICING ASSURANCES AGAINST INVASION OF CUBA BY US AND OTHERS.
AFTER SOME DISCUSSION OF THIS PROPOSAL IT WAS AGREED UN SHOULD
FORMULATE IT IN WRITING AND SUBMIT IT TO US FOR STUDY.
STEVENSON EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO LONG-TERM
SAFEGUARDS AND RECALLED THAT THOSE SUGGESTED SO FAR INCLUDE

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-3- 1781, November 14, 8 p.m. from New York

(1) SOV ASSURANCES OF NON-REINTRODUCTION, (2) CONTINUED US AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE, (3) LA NUCLEAR FREE ZONE WITH APPROPRIATE INSPECTION, AND (4) UN INSPECTION AGAINST REINTRODUCTION AND INVASION AS JUST SUGGESTED BY NARASIMHAN. MCCLOY SUGGESTED UN AERIAL SURVEILLANCE IN CARIBBEAN AS POSSIBLE VARIANT. UN OFFICIALS EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE DOUBT WHETHER NUCLEAR FREE ZONE COULD BE ORGANIZED WITHOUT DELAY OF SEVERAL MONTHS.

IN CONCLUSION THERE WAS BRIEF DISCUSSION OF CONDUCT AND PROCEDURES IN FINAL SC MTG ON CUBA. THANT SAID POSSIBILITIES HE HAD MENTIONED TO SOVS WERE (1) TRADITIONAL SC FORM OF RES, (2) DECLARATIONS BY PARTIES CONCERNED, IN WHICH CASE US STATEMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY ENDORSED BY OAS, WHICH MIGHT BE REPORTED TO SC BY CHILE AND VENEZUELA. (3) JOINT PROTOCOL AGREED BEFORE SC MTG, (4) COMBINATION OF RES AND DECLARATIONS WHEREBY RES MIGHT WELCOME SOME POINTS IN DECLARATIONS AND TAKE NOTE OF OTHERS. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION VIEW WAS GENERALLY EXPRESSED THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY BE IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN AGREEMENT ON EITHER PROTOCOL OR RES AND THAT JOINT DECLARATIONS WOULD BE SIMPLEST SOLUTION. STEVENSON POINTED OUT THAT US IS, OF COURSE NOT IN POSITION TO PREDICT WHAT OAS ACTION MIGHT BE. WE WOULD SUPPOSE OAS MIGHT, AFTER SOVS HAD COMPLIED WITH THEIR COMMITMENTS, REPEAL ITS RES OF OCT 23 BUT WE CANNOT YET KNOW WHAT OTHER ACTION OAS MIGHT TAKE.

STEVENSON

LTR/14

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE 11/14/62, 9 PM.

NOTE: Passed Principal Officers Executive Committee Per Mr. Rogers
11/14/CWO-W

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CW-952

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The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited_{UH1 2005}

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The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited: An International Collection of Documents, from the Bay of Pigs to the Brink of Nuclear War

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The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited: An International Collection of Documents, from the Bay of Pigs to the Brink of Nuclear War reproduces a comprehensive collection of records from the archives of the three key governments involved in the most dangerous confrontation of the Cold war. Declassified records from the United States, Russia and Cuba significantly advance analysis of the historical foundations of the missile crisis, the policy calculations and considerations of President John F. Kennedy and premiers Nikita Khrushchev and Fidel Castro, and the overt and covert military and paramilitary operations that combined to bring the world to the threshold of a nuclear exchange. Topics extensively covered in the documentation include the failed U.S.-led invasion at the Bay of Pigs, renewed attempts to overthrow Castro through Operation Mongoose and Operation Northwoods, U.S. military contingency planning for conflict with Cuba, naval warfare, Soviet and Cuban decision making and communications during the crisis, and the repercussions for U.S.-Soviet relations, and Soviet-Cuban relations in its aftermath. Materials were identified, obtained, assembled and indexed by the National Security Archive, a non-profit Washington D.C. based research institute and library. The microfiche collection is accompanied by a printed guide and index.

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